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Should ratification proceed?  
An Assessment of Different Options  
after the Failed Referenda 
Sebastian Kurpas* 
 
From deep coma to death? 
After the resounding Dutch no-vote of 62%, 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty has 
become even less likely than it already was after 
the political earthquake caused by the French 
referendum three days before. While the 
German Chancellor and the French President 
encourage other countries to continue with the 
ratification process, the British message is 
clear: Any attempt to proceed at this point 
would be pointless. British Foreign Minister 
Jack Straw found rather subtle words in the 
House of Commons to describe the situation, 
but other sources suggest that instead of 
wasting their time on a lengthy and useless 
exercise that would cost the EU even more 
support, European leaders should bury the 
Constitution at the upcoming European 
Summit on 16-17 June (or soon afterwards) 
and then settle for something ‘more modest’.  
The motivation for sending such a message is 
not altruistic of course. The new situation 
opens a unique opportunity for Blair and the 
British EU Presidency. A whole list of reasons 
can thus be given for the British position: 
•  Blair would not have to hold a referendum 
that he is set to lose. (If the Dutch reject the 
treaty with 62%, one does not even want to 
imagine the British scenario – latest polls 
suggest a no-vote of 72%.) 
•  The European project could now be given a 
long-term direction that is much more 
reconcilable with British public opinion. 
•  The UK can play an active and constructive 
role in European politics as a ‘crisis manager’ 
(with the French weakened and a lame-duck 
government in Germany until early elections in 
September). 
•  If ratification will be stopped already now, the 
French position in the EU will be weakened for a 
long period of time. If the French should ever 
reproach the British for obstructing European 
integration in the future, they will receive resounding 
laughter followed by the question: “Who was it again 
that killed the Constitution?” 
It would thus be understandable if the British pushed for 
an official ‘death declaration’ in the near future. They 
could then propose a ‘tidying-up’ of the current treaties 
and suggest that the EU should concentrate on its 
economic ‘core competences’ (internal market, 
competition policy, external trade) and continue to play a 
coordinating role (but no more!) where it strengthens the 
member states’ political interests (e.g. foreign and 
security policy and certain aspects of justice and home 
affairs). 
Accordingly, it should not aspire to become a polity in its 
own right, let alone attempt to inspire some kind of 
‘European identity’. Efforts to strengthen the Commission 
(and possibly the European Parliament) are unlikely to be 
encouraged. At the same time, the British will continue to 
push for enlargement – including Turkey – to ensure an 
even larger economic community and a potential dynamic 
for growth, but which would also make it harder to 
strengthen the ‘supranational’ dimension of the EU.  
The British – once at the fringes of European integration – 
can present this approach as sensible and realistic in view 
of the abyss of disintegration and chaos. The upcoming 
EU presidency will be a possibility to present the British 
government as a pragmatic manager of a crisis caused 
(mainly) by the French.  
The British view has largely met a positive reception in 
the media and among other opinion-makers. Before such 
a consequential decision is taken, however, those who are 
responsible must have a clear idea of the alternative 
scenarios and the probability of finding a common 
agreement on them. This Policy Brief looks a little closer 
at the different options available and assesses their 
respective advantages and disadvantages. 
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1. Continuing ratification (possibly after a ‘period 
of reflection’) 
The only possibility to ‘save’ the text in its entirety would 
be to continue with ratification. Plebiscites could either 
continue as foreseen or after ‘freezing’ the process of 
ratification for some time before continuing with the 
referenda. At the end of this exercise, the ‘wounded’ 
would have to be counted while hoping for more 
favourable conditions for a second vote in the countries 
that rejected the Constitution. If such a second vote is to 
be successful, however, it will have to happen in a 
completely changed political context. Particularly the 
French vote was to a considerable extent motivated by a 
‘vote sanction’ on the current executive and the only way 
that there might be a better chance for public approval 
would be with a new ‘strong personality’ like e.g. Nicolas 
Sarkozy as French President. Such a change, however, 
will probably not happen before 2007 (unless President 
Chirac would resign earlier), so that the process of 
ratification would indeed have to be ‘frozen’ for some 
time. In the meantime the other governments would have 
to be reassured that this second referendum will 
eventually be held, because otherwise, Blair (and perhaps 
others) will have an excellent argument for not holding 
their referendum at all. 
Linked to the continuation of the ratification process is 
also the idea of amending the current text with a 
‘protocol’ that would address certain fears that 
particularly seemed to motivate the no-voters in certain 
member states. This could indeed be envisaged for certain 
‘opt-out’ scenarios (where voters demand ‘less Europe’), 
although most innovations of the Constitutional Treaty do 
not allow for it (e.g. the double majority system or the 
abolition of the ‘pillar structure’). In the particular French 
case where apparently many voters rejected the 
Constitutional Treaty for the lack of a social dimension, 
an ‘opt-out’ would not work either. Instead, for example, 
the Council would have to commit itself in a special 
protocol to especially take into account the social 
dimension when it legislates. However, it is unlikely that 
such a protocol would be accepted by a large number of 
other member states and it is also doubtful that the French 
would actually change their minds because of such a 
rather ‘declaratory’ addendum. 
Arguments in favour of continuation: 
  Continuation would ensure that every country gets a 
say on the Constitutional Treaty. This also complies 
with the procedure foreseen in ‘Declaration No. 30’ 
annexed to the text of the Constitutional Treaty. 
  It would be the only way to keep the option of 
adopting the Constitutional Treaty in its entirety. If 
leaders proclaim the current text ‘dead’, the need for 
a more efficient, democratic and transparent Union 
will of course persist. 
Arguments against include:  
  Continuing ratification would leave the EU in a state 
of uncertainty and bears the considerable risk that the 
process develops an even more negative dynamic: 
The referenda could become a vote on the legitimacy 
of the EU itself and with a growing number of no’s, 
the yes-campaigns would have a difficult time 
making their case. 
  It is still doubtful that any (new) political leadership 
in the member states that rejected the treaty would 
actually want to take the (high) risk of calling a 
second vote on the same text, because such a strategy 
could easily be interpreted as ‘arrogance of power’ 
vis-à-vis the citizens. A possible second no-vote 
could thus seriously harm a national leader’s political 
career without bringing about a solution. 
2. Full renegotiation 
In the French debate, the no-side often claimed that a 
French rejection would send a clear signal for a 
renegotiation on French terms. It was, however, never 
specified how this should come about and that was for a 
very good reason: because full renegotiation is simply 
‘not an option’. Anyone who has followed the complex 
process of consensus-building in the Convention and the 
subsequent two intergovernmental conferences knows 
very well that there is no room for any substantial change 
of the current text. For example, the demands of the 
French left for more ‘social Europe’ are diametrically 
opposed to the demands of many British and Dutch (and 
even French ‘souverainistes’) for less European 
interference. And even if a new agreement were to be 
negotiated, it would be far from clear whether this would 
be acceptable to the population. Currently there is 
absolutely no political will to take up the lengthy and 
controversial process of negotiating anew. 
3. ‘Nice-plus’ 
Such a ‘cherry-picking’ approach would envisage that on 
the one hand certain elements are taken from the 
Constitutional Treaty which might not even need 
ratification and are politically undisputed. Examples 
include: 
  the Foreign Minister (in a probably somewhat 
watered-down version, meaning essentially the fusion 
of the two existing posts of High Representative and 
Commissioner for External Relations through an 
Inter-Institutional Agreement that has to make very 
clear when the FM acts in which function), 
  the External Action Service,  
  the Citizens Initiative, 
  the early warning mechanism for national parliaments 
and 
  measures concerning the functioning and the 
configurations of the Council of Ministers. 
On the other hand (and maybe only at a later stage), other 
more ambitious, but much-needed elements could be 
introduced to make the EU more efficient (e.g. the double 
majority system or extending qualified majority voting) 
and more democratic (e.g. strengthening the European 
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Arguments in favour: 
  In the current political situation, this seems to be the 
most feasible solution. 
  It would ensure a limited, but certain quick ‘return’ 
by avoiding the aforementioned risks of continuation. 
Arguments against: 
  The big weakness of this approach is that the much- 
disputed institutional ‘package deal’ would most 
certainly have to be unravelled again. De facto 
(limited) new negotiations would have to take place 
eventually, because very often one group of member 
states only accepted a certain element in exchange for 
assurances that their favoured arrangements would 
also be accepted. There is a considerable risk that 
negotiations would ultimately only lead to very 
meagre results.
1 
  The second weakness is of course the loss of 
coherence (e.g. perpetuation of the complicated 
‘pillar structure’) that would have been achieved 
through the Constitutional Treaty. This shows the 
‘added value’ of this text which is more than just the 
sum of its parts. 
4. A ‘Constitutional Treaty Light’ 
This approach has lately been put forward again by 
members of the cabinet of the Polish President 
Kwasniewski. It would basically mean that instead of 
‘cherry-picking’, a core part would be cut out of the 
current constitutional text. This core part would 
essentially consist of Part I (Arts I-1 to I-60) of the 
current Constitutional Treaty (or at least considerable 
parts of it). The preamble and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (Part II) would be dropped without substitution. 
Part III would also be dropped, but its substitution would 
– of course – be the existing treaties (Treaty establishing 
the European Community and Treaty establishing the 
European Union with their respective protocols). Part IV 
could only be preserved partly (essentially Arts IV-440 to 
IV-448). In the existing parts any reference to the word 
‘Constitution’ would probably be eliminated and replaced 
by ‘Treaty’. Certain controversial articles that are not 
essential for a more democratic or efficient Union but that 
create the impression of a European ‘super-state’ could be 
scrapped, e.g. Art. I-8 (“Symbols of the Union”). 
Finally, the provisions in Part I that refer to the then 
scrapped Parts II and III would of course either have to be 
(partly) omitted (e.g. Art. I-9.1) or some of the provisions 
in Part III would have to be included in the text of the 
new treaty or in a protocol (see e.g. provisions mentioned 
in Arts I-40 to I-44 and in Arts I-53, I-55 and. I-60). 
Arguments in favour: 
                                                 
1 See Sebastian Kurpas, What could be saved from the 
European Constitution if ratification fails? The Problems 
with a ‘Plan B’, CEPS Policy Brief No. 70, May 2005. 
  This approach would save the most substantial part of 
the Constitutional Treaty. The first part is clearly the 
heart of the text and includes almost all of the 
controversial institutional innovations. 
  By keeping the first part, the unravelling of the 
complicated ‘package deal’ (and thus controversial 
negotiations) on the institutions could be avoided. 
Arguments against: 
  The problem with this approach is that Art. IV-437 
(“repeal of treaties”) would have to be scrapped. The 
new text would thus not repeal the old treaties and 
replace them, but rather co-exist alongside them. The 
existing treaties would have to be ‘adapted’ in order 
not to be in contradiction with the new one, which 
would essentially mean that the old treaties would 
become a kind of ‘Part III’. While, for example the 
old treaties are based on the concept of the pillar 
structure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, the 
new treaty would repeal that. Probably adaptations to 
the existing treaties would have to be so extensive 
that many would (rightly) view this approach as 
introducing the existing Constitutional Treaty ‘by the 
backdoor’. 
  With the old treaties continuing to exist, there would 
be several equal sources of law instead of just one 
coherent one. The provisions of the new treaty would 
– even with the old treaties adapted – run the risk of 
being interpreted differently than the Court has so far 
interpreted the old ones. A potential source for legal 
inconsistency and therefore uncertainty would thus 
remain. 
Conclusion 
As this brief overview shows, there is no scenario that 
comes without considerable disadvantages. Under the 
current circumstances, the most likely one seems to be 
(unfortunately) some kind of ‘Nice-plus’. But whatever 
option is taken, ratification should only be stopped for 
good, if there is an alternative on the table that is on the 
one hand potentially acceptable to all member states and 
on the other hand ambitious enough to provide for a more 
efficient and democratic functioning of the enlarged EU-
25. Simply burying the Constitutional Treaty and 
continuing on the basis of the Nice Treaty with some 
cosmetic changes is not an option, if politicians intend to 
take the massive criticism on the current state of the 
Union into account. Among the strongest sentiments 
behind the recent no votes is the widespread public 
perception that the EU is an undemocratic and inefficient 
bureaucracy that is lacking in transparency and largely 
detached from the citizens. It is ironic that the 
Constitutional Treaty – although certainly not perfect – 
actually addresses this criticism to some extent and would 
have clearly improved the status quo. If political leaders 
decide to scrap the Constitutional Treaty, they must have 
a very clear idea of how they want to tackle the 
substantial problems of the current institutional set-up.  
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